2017 February California Bar Exam Forum

[cal_pushed]

How did people frame their section and subsection headers for PT b? Like just I. Immunity; or did you guys forecast like: I. City likely Has/does not Immunity?

[cal_pushed]

Curious as to how everyone approached Corp Q. Did you discuss Corp formation or agency authority for part 1. What about part 2 shareholder suits? And can't remember part 3....?

I discussed agency authority. And I've been angst-ridden ever since about whether that's the right analysis for the question of a Director/Officer's liability for a corporate contract (as opposed to a principal's liability for a contract entered into by an agent). I've been thinking not, ever since the exam ended, and that I screwed up by spending time on authority that I should have been spent on de facto/de jure/estoppel corporate formation (based on what people here are saying though, not based on my memory of the question... was formation REALLY an issue or was the problem written away it was assumed to be ok??). I also completely missed the issue of piercing the veil, which was probably one of the most important on this question.

I think I hit everything else, and decently though. Any reassurances that 1) authority actually was worth some points to analyze and 2) an answer that omitted formation and pcv but was otherwise good could still be above a 55 would be much appreciated

(my other answers, if I recall right, had to do with respective duties, obligations and liabilities (with lots of focus on duty of care/biz judgment, duty to disclose, and limited liability in general, although I may have muddied the exception applications up a bit), and a bit on distribution order during dissolution/liquidation, and shareholders' rights to sue, including for when the proper steps aren't followed in a fundamental change to corporate structure. I also didn't go into much detail over the sale of XYZ supplies to the company other than it didn't violate a duty of loyalty since he got the board's ok)

I don't think formation was an issue bc the facts stated the corp was already a Corp entity. There were no facts to argue there was some defective formation and finding a general partnership. The question asked how Suppkier could hold Corp liable and A. So I discussed the agency for Director/officer authority to contract with 3rd P Supplier since president is an agent of the corp and reasonable for S to think A had authority. Thus Corp is liable for the k. And then Pvc to pierce Corp's veil and get to A personally bc under capitalization and alter ego.

Part 2- I discussed directors duties of loyalty for conflict tx with xyz and No disinterested board since the other members were his family, only other shareholder is B and terms likely aren't fair. Also duty of care for the same reasons and then taking inventory. Which is how B could bring direct and derivative suit to recovery losses to herself for stocks she paid for and the corp for the losses for A stealing stuff and the xyz tx and no BJR protection.

Part 3- distribution at dissolution and creditor priority but A's loan is subordinated bc of all his wrongdoing.

I don't think formation was an issue bc it was already in the facts and I didn't see anything about Corp fundamental changes. But I did miss the issue of improper distribution.

Improper distribution?

[lhanvt13]

How did people frame their section and subsection headers for PT b? Like just I. Immunity; or did you guys forecast like: I. City likely Has/does not Immunity?

I did this:

I. Whether city can claim immunity through Ultra VIRES stuff, doing governmental function stuff etc.

A. Whether City did shit not in accordance with dat charter so ultra
1) charter element 1
2) charter element 2
3) charter element 3
4) charter element 4

B. Whether city did X so gov function thus immunity
1) arg for governmental
2) arg for private

C. Whether city got benefits blah so not immune
1) benefit analysis

D. Conclusion
Nein

II. Whether City did Blah so QM
QM is such and such
1) element 1
2)
3)
4) element 4
Conclusion: Probably QM

III. Whether City is liable for extensive damages due to QM and city no immunity
1) some damage stuff
2) some other damage stuff
3) fuckig damages
4) Conclusion: city damages

IV. Conclusion
City gonna regret cuz no immune, QM, and holy damages
Shit gonna be bad for city


---

Also, yeah I think Ontario had a car with QMERUIT on it. Laughed then judged them

[Lawless!]

Curious as to how everyone approached Corp Q. Did you discuss Corp formation or agency authority for part 1. What about part 2 shareholder suits? And can't remember part 3....?

I discussed agency authority. And I've been angst-ridden ever since about whether that's the right analysis for the question of a Director/Officer's liability for a corporate contract (as opposed to a principal's liability for a contract entered into by an agent). I've been thinking not, ever since the exam ended, and that I screwed up by spending time on authority that I should have been spent on de facto/de jure/estoppel corporate formation (based on what people here are saying though, not based on my memory of the question... was formation REALLY an issue or was the problem written away it was assumed to be ok??). I also completely missed the issue of piercing the veil, which was probably one of the most important on this question.

I think I hit everything else, and decently though. Any reassurances that 1) authority actually was worth some points to analyze and 2) an answer that omitted formation and pcv but was otherwise good could still be above a 55 would be much appreciated

(my other answers, if I recall right, had to do with respective duties, obligations and liabilities (with lots of focus on duty of care/biz judgment, duty to disclose, and limited liability in general, although I may have muddied the exception applications up a bit), and a bit on distribution order during dissolution/liquidation, and shareholders' rights to sue, including for when the proper steps aren't followed in a fundamental change to corporate structure. I also didn't go into much detail over the sale of XYZ supplies to the company other than it didn't violate a duty of loyalty since he got the board's ok)

I don't think formation was an issue bc the facts stated the corp was already a Corp entity. There were no facts to argue there was some defective formation and finding a general partnership. The question asked how Suppkier could hold Corp liable and A. So I discussed the agency for Director/officer authority to contract with 3rd P Supplier since president is an agent of the corp and reasonable for S to think A had authority. Thus Corp is liable for the k. And then Pvc to pierce Corp's veil and get to A personally bc under capitalization and alter ego.

Part 2- I discussed directors duties of loyalty for conflict tx with xyz and No disinterested board since the other members were his family, only other shareholder is B and terms likely aren't fair. Also duty of care for the same reasons and then taking inventory. Which is how B could bring direct and derivative suit to recovery losses to herself for stocks she paid for and the corp for the losses for A stealing stuff and the xyz tx and no BJR protection.

Part 3- distribution at dissolution and creditor priority but A's loan is subordinated bc of all his wrongdoing.

I don't think formation was an issue bc it was already in the facts and I didn't see anything about Corp fundamental changes. But I did miss the issue of improper distribution.

Improper distribution?

Just a minor issue. The corp had profits some years and losses some years and at the same time BOD were paying out profts. So you could argue beach of duty of care and loyalty since that its imprudent to make any sort of distributions when the corp isn't stable financially.

[sittin_pretty]

How did people frame their section and subsection headers for PT b? Like just I. Immunity; or did you guys forecast like: I. City likely Has/does not Immunity?

I did this:
...
III. Whether City is liable for extensive damages due to QM and city no immunity
1) some damage stuff
2) some other damage stuff
3) fuckig damages
4) Conclusion: city damages

IV. Conclusion
City gonna regret cuz no immune, QM, and holy damages
Shit gonna be bad for city


---

I hope you wrote the answer JUST LIKE THAT!

So... slipping humor into bar exam answers. I did it. Hopefully only Democrats with senses of humor and not Trump fans read my answer on the question where IDEA was at issue and the state was whining about compliance/federal preemption, and I started off with... "Despite what our new Secretary of Education says, the federal IDEA does not trample on state rights...." (I almost spelled out Betsy De Vos but deleted b/c wasn't sure I was remembering the spelling of her name correctly )

I'll probably get dinged b/c some humorless apolitical grader thinks I'm injecting non-existent facts into the problem.

I just couldn't resist.

Thankfully, they didn't ask us about any questions pertaining to statements of facts because I would have made a snarky "unless you are a Trumpian lawyer, in which case the test is whether the statement of ALTERNATIVE facts ...." comment.

Because I'm bad like that.

[Lawless!]

What issues did people discuss for PR. Feel like I forced some. I went:

Attorney agreements
Contingency fees
Confidence
Competence
Diligence
Conflict
Concurrent conflict
Representation despite
Permissive withdrawal
Mandatory withdrawal

I agree w/ the need for "pushing" on this one. I felt like there weren't enough issues. The largest paragraph was all literally just L's attempts to communicate w/ C.

Anyway, my topics:

* I skipped fee agreement bc it said "valid agreement."
* Competence -- personal injury attorney doing slip & fall... no violation
* Keep client property safely -- dumbo stored clothes in his office closet... violation
* Duty not to obstruct access to evidence -- ruined clothes
* Duty to communicate
* Close relationship w/ opposing counsel
* Permissive withdrawal -- repugnant course of action
* Mandatory withdrawal -- possibly fraud using attorneys services
* (Non)duty to take cases (i.e. when C begged L to not "fire" her after L had already given notice of withdrawal)
* Post withdrawal, inform client of withdrawal
* Post withdrawal, must return all client's property to client so she can continue w/ case... problematic here bc property is damaged and will prejudice her

I argued the same. But there wasn't a lot of big issues. I did really have to stretch those facts to make some arguments. But I did miss duty to properly withdraw... Damn

[SlowLearner]

I don't think much turns on which way you argued .... but i said withdrawal not justified

1.
I thought there was no real issue with meritless claim issue because she had real injuries and dress was damaged ... so reasonable evidence to believe claim was true.

2.
Communication while appearing reasonable did not suit client - she just did not respond to calls or emails but did respond to letters...

[Lawless!]

I don't think much turns on which way you argued .... but i said withdrawal not justified

1.
I thought there was no real issue with meritless claim issue because she had real injuries and dress was damaged ... so reasonable evidence to believe claim was true.

2.
Communication while appearing reasonable did not suit client - she just did not respond to calls or emails but did respond to letters...

I argued he had a duty to investigate the claim before filing both under aba and fed civ pro rules.

Also argued duty to communicate where he should have used alternative method to communicate like send her notice in the mail. I forgot that in the facts it did state he sent her a certified letter after all the emails. Hopefully it won't be detrimental.

[Guchster]

Pretty sure I failed, but on the bright side at least July will only be 2 days. I passed first time in NY a few summers ago, but I also had a high MBE and NY is a 50% MBE state. So I'm optimistic about July.

Seems like I missed major issues in most essays. Thought MBE went fine but probably not enough to cover screwing up on all the essays. Like totally screwed up the remedies question--had too much Torts and K analysis and barely any remedies discussion on THE REMEDIES essay. But I figured I would finish the exam because I paid for it and I wanted to make sure I can repeat my NY MBE score when I have to retake in July.

PT's seemed okay, but was definitely pulling crap out of my ass on PT-B and probably would've re-organized differently now that I have more than 4 hours of sleep, lol.

[MMCheung]

My outline for B:

I. Immunity
A. Rule: If governmental as opposed to proprietary function, immunity applies.
Analysis: in cases involving profit-generating water pipes and ball parks, function was consequently proprietary, so no immunity. In contrast, here, water treatment plant wasn't just NOT a money-maker, it's a money-loser, instead functioning for health, safety, wellbeing of citizens. Different from profit-generating water system in other case.
Conclusion: therefore, governmental function and immunity.
B. Rule: also immunity if lack of ability to contract (I didn't call it ultra vires, but same thing).
1. Law: case law saying if no ability to contract, no liability. But there's a mix of authority in following the lead precedent; while the original state supreme court case (Lyros?) indicates there doesn't have to be valid contract for Q.M., appellate court decision with dissent seems to limit that rule by holding that that if there's a city charter limiting how contracts entered into, failure to comply means no liability (but dissent says, wait! Lyros! Q.M!)
2. Analysis: No formal contract here, & didn't comply with city charter, but does that mean city didn't have ABILITY to contract? Valid arguments in both directions
3. Conclusion: Court could rule either way on ability to contract b/c of above, but still, probably immunity under I.A. (governmental, not proprietary, function)

II. Elements of QM clearly set forth in 1-2-3-4 format in one of the cases. Pretty easy to apply and go through. As long as you start with the right elements. Just plop in the right facts. (benefit? slightly disputable since didn't get grant... but probably still benefit because could help with future contracts & lots and lots of value/work performed... and accepted... etc. <--- delivered in organized 1-2-3-4 fashion). Conclusion: 4 elements satisfied.

III. Damages: one of the cases had an explicit discussion on the many types of damages allowed, including how the lower court had erred by not allowing damages for such thing as overhead and expected profits... which the appeals courts said COULD be allowed along with actual damages. Stuck to paraphrasing and applying that case. Conclusion: Blanchard can get compensated for everything on the invoice and then some.

IV. Overall conclusion: oops, forgot to do one. Hopefully won't matter too much.

I was going to organize my analysis like you did, basically, suggesting that newest (and lower ranking) case was a departure from previous two cases. But instead, opted to shape analysis as third case refining the law.

So for immunity, what I did was organized my rule around whether the city was operating under its governmental function or proprietary function.

If the gov't is sitting in its proprietary function, then a breach of the charter does not immunize the city from suit that a private corporation or individual would be liable to in the same situation. (See lyros where ct determined city operating in proprietary function, charter not satisfied -this fact was noted in the dissent in Harim - and the city was still liable. Also second sc case where ct stated city operating in its proprietary function and did not satisfy charter - this fact again only noted in the dissent In Harim - and city was liable for an).

If the statethe government is sitting in its govt function, city needs to satisfy charter or contract void and actions of city cannot be basis for civil damages. (See harim where ct did not specifically say city was operating in gov't function but getting a right of way and reclaiming wetlands not usually commercial or profit producing, yet it is Seth that benefits Health and welfare of citizens, charter not satisfied, and not liable.

Went into policy reasons for this impt requirement for when city operating in gov't function. That is, can't have city improperly expanding own power not delegated to city.

I then noted to dissent. And said dissent is not supported by law. Even police co discarded vehicles case that appellant corp stated to in case where judge dissented supports the harim opinion (city was operating under govt function for police services, and likely satisfied charter of that was analyzed by the ct, and the city was liable)

Here, city was in govt function. And not satisfy charter. Therefore not liable.

[cal_pushed]

My outline for B:

I. Immunity
A. Rule: If governmental as opposed to proprietary function, immunity applies.
Analysis: in cases involving profit-generating water pipes and ball parks, function was consequently proprietary, so no immunity. In contrast, here, water treatment plant wasn't just NOT a money-maker, it's a money-loser, instead functioning for health, safety, wellbeing of citizens. Different from profit-generating water system in other case.
Conclusion: therefore, governmental function and immunity.
B. Rule: also immunity if lack of ability to contract (I didn't call it ultra vires, but same thing).
1. Law: case law saying if no ability to contract, no liability. But there's a mix of authority in following the lead precedent; while the original state supreme court case (Lyros?) indicates there doesn't have to be valid contract for Q.M., appellate court decision with dissent seems to limit that rule by holding that that if there's a city charter limiting how contracts entered into, failure to comply means no liability (but dissent says, wait! Lyros! Q.M!)
2. Analysis: No formal contract here, & didn't comply with city charter, but does that mean city didn't have ABILITY to contract? Valid arguments in both directions
3. Conclusion: Court could rule either way on ability to contract b/c of above, but still, probably immunity under I.A. (governmental, not proprietary, function)

II. Elements of QM clearly set forth in 1-2-3-4 format in one of the cases. Pretty easy to apply and go through. As long as you start with the right elements. Just plop in the right facts. (benefit? slightly disputable since didn't get grant... but probably still benefit because could help with future contracts & lots and lots of value/work performed... and accepted... etc. <--- delivered in organized 1-2-3-4 fashion). Conclusion: 4 elements satisfied.

III. Damages: one of the cases had an explicit discussion on the many types of damages allowed, including how the lower court had erred by not allowing damages for such thing as overhead and expected profits... which the appeals courts said COULD be allowed along with actual damages. Stuck to paraphrasing and applying that case. Conclusion: Blanchard can get compensated for everything on the invoice and then some.

IV. Overall conclusion: oops, forgot to do one. Hopefully won't matter too much.

I was going to organize my analysis like you did, basically, suggesting that newest (and lower ranking) case was a departure from previous two cases. But instead, opted to shape analysis as third case refining the law.

So for immunity, what I did was organized my rule around whether the city was operating under its governmental function or proprietary function.

If the gov't is sitting in its proprietary function, then a breach of the charter does not immunize the city from suit that a private corporation or individual would be liable to in the same situation. (See lyros where ct determined city operating in proprietary function, charter not satisfied -this fact was noted in the dissent in Harim - and the city was still liable. Also second sc case where ct stated city operating in its proprietary function and did not satisfy charter - this fact again only noted in the dissent In Harim - and city was liable for an).

If the statethe government is sitting in its govt function, city needs to satisfy charter or contract void and actions of city cannot be basis for civil damages. (See harim where ct did not specifically say city was operating in gov't function but getting a right of way and reclaiming wetlands not usually commercial or profit producing, yet it is Seth that benefits Health and welfare of citizens, charter not satisfied, and not liable.

Went into policy reasons for this impt requirement for when city operating in gov't function. That is, can't have city improperly expanding own power not delegated to city.

I then noted to dissent. And said dissent is not supported by law. Even police co discarded vehicles case that appellant corp stated to in case where judge dissented supports the harim opinion (city was operating under govt function for police services, and likely satisfied charter of that was analyzed by the ct, and the city was liable)

Here, city was in govt function. And not satisfy charter. Therefore not liable.

So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...

[MMCheung]

My outline for B:

I. Immunity
A. Rule: If governmental as opposed to proprietary function, immunity applies.
Analysis: in cases involving profit-generating water pipes and ball parks, function was consequently proprietary, so no immunity. In contrast, here, water treatment plant wasn't just NOT a money-maker, it's a money-loser, instead functioning for health, safety, wellbeing of citizens. Different from profit-generating water system in other case.
Conclusion: therefore, governmental function and immunity.
B. Rule: also immunity if lack of ability to contract (I didn't call it ultra vires, but same thing).
1. Law: case law saying if no ability to contract, no liability. But there's a mix of authority in following the lead precedent; while the original state supreme court case (Lyros?) indicates there doesn't have to be valid contract for Q.M., appellate court decision with dissent seems to limit that rule by holding that that if there's a city charter limiting how contracts entered into, failure to comply means no liability (but dissent says, wait! Lyros! Q.M!)
2. Analysis: No formal contract here, & didn't comply with city charter, but does that mean city didn't have ABILITY to contract? Valid arguments in both directions
3. Conclusion: Court could rule either way on ability to contract b/c of above, but still, probably immunity under I.A. (governmental, not proprietary, function)

II. Elements of QM clearly set forth in 1-2-3-4 format in one of the cases. Pretty easy to apply and go through. As long as you start with the right elements. Just plop in the right facts. (benefit? slightly disputable since didn't get grant... but probably still benefit because could help with future contracts & lots and lots of value/work performed... and accepted... etc. <--- delivered in organized 1-2-3-4 fashion). Conclusion: 4 elements satisfied.

III. Damages: one of the cases had an explicit discussion on the many types of damages allowed, including how the lower court had erred by not allowing damages for such thing as overhead and expected profits... which the appeals courts said COULD be allowed along with actual damages. Stuck to paraphrasing and applying that case. Conclusion: Blanchard can get compensated for everything on the invoice and then some.

IV. Overall conclusion: oops, forgot to do one. Hopefully won't matter too much.

I was going to organize my analysis like you did, basically, suggesting that newest (and lower ranking) case was a departure from previous two cases. But instead, opted to shape analysis as third case refining the law.

So for immunity, what I did was organized my rule around whether the city was operating under its governmental function or proprietary function.

If the gov't is sitting in its proprietary function, then a breach of the charter does not immunize the city from suit that a private corporation or individual would be liable to in the same situation. (See lyros where ct determined city operating in proprietary function, charter not satisfied -this fact was noted in the dissent in Harim - and the city was still liable. Also second sc case where ct stated city operating in its proprietary function and did not satisfy charter - this fact again only noted in the dissent In Harim - and city was liable for an).

If the statethe government is sitting in its govt function, city needs to satisfy charter or contract void and actions of city cannot be basis for civil damages. (See harim where ct did not specifically say city was operating in gov't function but getting a right of way and reclaiming wetlands not usually commercial or profit producing, yet it is Seth that benefits Health and welfare of citizens, charter not satisfied, and not liable.

Went into policy reasons for this impt requirement for when city operating in gov't function. That is, can't have city improperly expanding own power not delegated to city.

I then noted to dissent. And said dissent is not supported by law. Even police co discarded vehicles case that appellant corp stated to in case where judge dissented supports the harim opinion (city was operating under govt function for police services, and likely satisfied charter of that was analyzed by the ct, and the city was liable)

Here, city was in govt function. And not satisfy charter. Therefore not liable.

So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...

Yes.

It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?

[cal_pushed]

My outline for B:

I. Immunity
A. Rule: If governmental as opposed to proprietary function, immunity applies.
Analysis: in cases involving profit-generating water pipes and ball parks, function was consequently proprietary, so no immunity. In contrast, here, water treatment plant wasn't just NOT a money-maker, it's a money-loser, instead functioning for health, safety, wellbeing of citizens. Different from profit-generating water system in other case.
Conclusion: therefore, governmental function and immunity.
B. Rule: also immunity if lack of ability to contract (I didn't call it ultra vires, but same thing).
1. Law: case law saying if no ability to contract, no liability. But there's a mix of authority in following the lead precedent; while the original state supreme court case (Lyros?) indicates there doesn't have to be valid contract for Q.M., appellate court decision with dissent seems to limit that rule by holding that that if there's a city charter limiting how contracts entered into, failure to comply means no liability (but dissent says, wait! Lyros! Q.M!)
2. Analysis: No formal contract here, & didn't comply with city charter, but does that mean city didn't have ABILITY to contract? Valid arguments in both directions
3. Conclusion: Court could rule either way on ability to contract b/c of above, but still, probably immunity under I.A. (governmental, not proprietary, function)

II. Elements of QM clearly set forth in 1-2-3-4 format in one of the cases. Pretty easy to apply and go through. As long as you start with the right elements. Just plop in the right facts. (benefit? slightly disputable since didn't get grant... but probably still benefit because could help with future contracts & lots and lots of value/work performed... and accepted... etc. <--- delivered in organized 1-2-3-4 fashion). Conclusion: 4 elements satisfied.

III. Damages: one of the cases had an explicit discussion on the many types of damages allowed, including how the lower court had erred by not allowing damages for such thing as overhead and expected profits... which the appeals courts said COULD be allowed along with actual damages. Stuck to paraphrasing and applying that case. Conclusion: Blanchard can get compensated for everything on the invoice and then some.

IV. Overall conclusion: oops, forgot to do one. Hopefully won't matter too much.

I was going to organize my analysis like you did, basically, suggesting that newest (and lower ranking) case was a departure from previous two cases. But instead, opted to shape analysis as third case refining the law.

So for immunity, what I did was organized my rule around whether the city was operating under its governmental function or proprietary function.

If the gov't is sitting in its proprietary function, then a breach of the charter does not immunize the city from suit that a private corporation or individual would be liable to in the same situation. (See lyros where ct determined city operating in proprietary function, charter not satisfied -this fact was noted in the dissent in Harim - and the city was still liable. Also second sc case where ct stated city operating in its proprietary function and did not satisfy charter - this fact again only noted in the dissent In Harim - and city was liable for an).

If the statethe government is sitting in its govt function, city needs to satisfy charter or contract void and actions of city cannot be basis for civil damages. (See harim where ct did not specifically say city was operating in gov't function but getting a right of way and reclaiming wetlands not usually commercial or profit producing, yet it is Seth that benefits Health and welfare of citizens, charter not satisfied, and not liable.

Went into policy reasons for this impt requirement for when city operating in gov't function. That is, can't have city improperly expanding own power not delegated to city.

I then noted to dissent. And said dissent is not supported by law. Even police co discarded vehicles case that appellant corp stated to in case where judge dissented supports the harim opinion (city was operating under govt function for police services, and likely satisfied charter of that was analyzed by the ct, and the city was liable)

Here, city was in govt function. And not satisfy charter. Therefore not liable.

So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...

Yes.

It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?

I said basically City can seek immunity by either showing they were acting in governmental capacity, barring that, that city officials acting ultra virus would also be a bar. But felt like if it was government function, no getting into ultra virus - because it's moot. If you're acting Persian to gov function, how can it be ultra virus (outside the scope), because if its outside the scope I figured then that means it's not government function.... because it's outside the scope. Idk. I'm sure there's more than one correct way to roll that thing out.

[MMCheung]

My outline for B:

I. Immunity
A. Rule: If governmental as opposed to proprietary function, immunity applies.
Analysis: in cases involving profit-generating water pipes and ball parks, function was consequently proprietary, so no immunity. In contrast, here, water treatment plant wasn't just NOT a money-maker, it's a money-loser, instead functioning for health, safety, wellbeing of citizens. Different from profit-generating water system in other case.
Conclusion: therefore, governmental function and immunity.
B. Rule: also immunity if lack of ability to contract (I didn't call it ultra vires, but same thing).
1. Law: case law saying if no ability to contract, no liability. But there's a mix of authority in following the lead precedent; while the original state supreme court case (Lyros?) indicates there doesn't have to be valid contract for Q.M., appellate court decision with dissent seems to limit that rule by holding that that if there's a city charter limiting how contracts entered into, failure to comply means no liability (but dissent says, wait! Lyros! Q.M!)
2. Analysis: No formal contract here, & didn't comply with city charter, but does that mean city didn't have ABILITY to contract? Valid arguments in both directions
3. Conclusion: Court could rule either way on ability to contract b/c of above, but still, probably immunity under I.A. (governmental, not proprietary, function)

II. Elements of QM clearly set forth in 1-2-3-4 format in one of the cases. Pretty easy to apply and go through. As long as you start with the right elements. Just plop in the right facts. (benefit? slightly disputable since didn't get grant... but probably still benefit because could help with future contracts & lots and lots of value/work performed... and accepted... etc. <--- delivered in organized 1-2-3-4 fashion). Conclusion: 4 elements satisfied.

III. Damages: one of the cases had an explicit discussion on the many types of damages allowed, including how the lower court had erred by not allowing damages for such thing as overhead and expected profits... which the appeals courts said COULD be allowed along with actual damages. Stuck to paraphrasing and applying that case. Conclusion: Blanchard can get compensated for everything on the invoice and then some.

IV. Overall conclusion: oops, forgot to do one. Hopefully won't matter too much.

I was going to organize my analysis like you did, basically, suggesting that newest (and lower ranking) case was a departure from previous two cases. But instead, opted to shape analysis as third case refining the law.

So for immunity, what I did was organized my rule around whether the city was operating under its governmental function or proprietary function.

If the gov't is sitting in its proprietary function, then a breach of the charter does not immunize the city from suit that a private corporation or individual would be liable to in the same situation. (See lyros where ct determined city operating in proprietary function, charter not satisfied -this fact was noted in the dissent in Harim - and the city was still liable. Also second sc case where ct stated city operating in its proprietary function and did not satisfy charter - this fact again only noted in the dissent In Harim - and city was liable for an).

If the statethe government is sitting in its govt function, city needs to satisfy charter or contract void and actions of city cannot be basis for civil damages. (See harim where ct did not specifically say city was operating in gov't function but getting a right of way and reclaiming wetlands not usually commercial or profit producing, yet it is Seth that benefits Health and welfare of citizens, charter not satisfied, and not liable.

Went into policy reasons for this impt requirement for when city operating in gov't function. That is, can't have city improperly expanding own power not delegated to city.

I then noted to dissent. And said dissent is not supported by law. Even police co discarded vehicles case that appellant corp stated to in case where judge dissented supports the harim opinion (city was operating under govt function for police services, and likely satisfied charter of that was analyzed by the ct, and the city was liable)

Here, city was in govt function. And not satisfy charter. Therefore not liable.

So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...

Yes.

It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?

I said basically City can seek immunity by either showing they were acting in governmental capacity, barring that, that city officials acting ultra virus would also be a bar. But felt like if it was government function, no getting into ultra virus - because it's moot. If you're acting Persian to gov function, how can it be ultra virus (outside the scope), because if its outside the scope I figured then that means it's not government function.... because it's outside the scope. Idk. I'm sure there's more than one correct way to roll that thing out.

From my reading, the policy discussion in Hiram was about how when gov't acts as govt, it needs to only act within the boundaries set out for it by state implies that the ultra vires discussion related to when gov't acting as govt. I can dsfi Italy see your argument.

My weakness was I took so much time figuring out my rule and approach and double checking it that I didn't have time to weite "on the other hand", insert point ab there being different ways to use the cases, and p could use cases as arguing... and the. Also had very little time for last two sections. Though last two sections I thought had very little debate. City screwed if no immunity.

Ugh.

[sittin_pretty]

So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...

Yes.

It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?

I said basically City can seek immunity by either showing they were acting in governmental capacity, barring that, that city officials acting ultra virus would also be a bar. But felt like if it was government function, no getting into ultra virus - because it's moot. If you're acting Persian to gov function, how can it be ultra virus (outside the scope), because if its outside the scope I figured then that means it's not government function.... because it's outside the scope. Idk. I'm sure there's more than one correct way to roll that thing out.

Me, I was consciously quite aware that I was confused about how the two different immunity issues ((1) gov't v proprietary function + (2) ultra vires/authority to contract) related to each other. I couldn't, after a few minute of thinking about it and re-skimming the cases, decide if one was a prerequisite for the other, if it was either/or, both/and, or how exactly the two halves fit together. So I made the conscious decision not to waste much time trying to figure that out. I made a calculated gamble that if I just argued each issue separately without pinpointing exactly how they relate to each other, I'd get a decent enough score. (and I just finessed the connection with the "could also be immune if..." kind of bridge)

Hopefully, we're all right

[asdf123456]

Yeah I was also caught off guard by how dissimilar the 2 immunity issues were, one of them didn't even use the word immunity. I was actually so caught off guard that I decided to attack it 3>2>1. Ended up having like 30m for Issue 1 of PTB so all I got out was a shotgun vomit of the ultra vires rule and wrote some garbage about some provisions in the charter are more material than other provisions in the charter. Didn't even have time for the governmental immunity thing, even though I starred it in the library.

But it sounds like it's gonna work out ok for you? Given that you just kinda ignored them and treated it as 2 separate doctrines.

Given how bad I fucked up issue 1, do you think a 60 is possible?

Also, what did everyone say about the guy who was being chased by dogs and trespassed over a fence and the landowner made him go back to the dogs. I can't fully remember the answer choices but I think one was Guy liable for trespass, neighbor liable for battery and neighbor liable for negligence or something. I can't remember the choices that well.

So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...

Yes.

It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?

I said basically City can seek immunity by either showing they were acting in governmental capacity, barring that, that city officials acting ultra virus would also be a bar. But felt like if it was government function, no getting into ultra virus - because it's moot. If you're acting Persian to gov function, how can it be ultra virus (outside the scope), because if its outside the scope I figured then that means it's not government function.... because it's outside the scope. Idk. I'm sure there's more than one correct way to roll that thing out.

Me, I was consciously quite aware that I was confused about how the two different immunity issues ((1) gov't v proprietary function + (2) ultra vires/authority to contract) related to each other. I couldn't, after a few minute of thinking about it and re-skimming the cases, decide if one was a prerequisite for the other, if it was either/or, both/and, or how exactly the two halves fit together. So I made the conscious decision not to waste much time trying to figure that out. I made a calculated gamble that if I just argued each issue separately without pinpointing exactly how they relate to each other, I'd get a decent enough score. (and I just finessed the connection with the "could also be immune if..." kind of bridge)

Hopefully, we're all right

[MMCheung]

So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...

Yes.

It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?

I said basically City can seek immunity by either showing they were acting in governmental capacity, barring that, that city officials acting ultra virus would also be a bar. But felt like if it was government function, no getting into ultra virus - because it's moot. If you're acting Persian to gov function, how can it be ultra virus (outside the scope), because if its outside the scope I figured then that means it's not government function.... because it's outside the scope. Idk. I'm sure there's more than one correct way to roll that thing out.

Me, I was consciously quite aware that I was confused about how the two different immunity issues ((1) gov't v proprietary function + (2) ultra vires/authority to contract) related to each other. I couldn't, after a few minute of thinking about it and re-skimming the cases, decide if one was a prerequisite for the other, if it was either/or, both/and, or how exactly the two halves fit together. So I made the conscious decision not to waste much time trying to figure that out. I made a calculated gamble that if I just argued each issue separately without pinpointing exactly how they relate to each other, I'd get a decent enough score. (and I just finessed the connection with the "could also be immune if..." kind of bridge)

Hopefully, we're all right

That sounds like a good strategy.

I was being a stubborn ass. Was maybe a little too enthusiastic about that issue, but was so because I think that issue was main challenge of that PT.

Good luck!!

[ThirdCharm]

OMG...I am still physically and psychologically consumed by the bar exam.
Every night since Tuesday I wake up from sleep remembering and realizing that I analyzed the law incorrectly or I missed another important issue.

[Snowboarder1588]

OMG...I am still physically and psychologically consumed by the bar exam.
Every night since Tuesday I wake up from sleep remembering and realizing that I analyzed the law incorrectly or I missed another important issue.

Hahaha...glad I'm not the only one going through this... I just hope I did well enough to never find out how I did on individual questions....

[rcharter1978]

OMG...I am still physically and psychologically consumed by the bar exam.
Every night since Tuesday I wake up from sleep remembering and realizing that I analyzed the law incorrectly or I missed another important issue.

Hahaha...glad I'm not the only one going through this... I just hope I did well enough to never find out how I did on individual questions....

Stop this immediately. Even if it requires copious amounts of liquor.

[Nicy]

Yeah I was also caught off guard by how dissimilar the 2 immunity issues were, one of them didn't even use the word immunity. I was actually so caught off guard that I decided to attack it 3>2>1. Ended up having like 30m for Issue 1 of PTB so all I got out was a shotgun vomit of the ultra vires rule and wrote some garbage about some provisions in the charter are more material than other provisions in the charter. Didn't even have time for the governmental immunity thing, even though I starred it in the library.

But it sounds like it's gonna work out ok for you? Given that you just kinda ignored them and treated it as 2 separate doctrines.

Given how bad I fucked up issue 1, do you think a 60 is possible?

Also, what did everyone say about the guy who was being chased by dogs and trespassed over a fence and the landowner made him go back to the dogs. I can't fully remember the answer choices but I think one was Guy liable for trespass, neighbor liable for battery and neighbor liable for negligence or something. I can't remember the choices that well.

So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...

Yes.

It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?

I said basically City can seek immunity by either showing they were acting in governmental capacity, barring that, that city officials acting ultra virus would also be a bar. But felt like if it was government function, no getting into ultra virus - because it's moot. If you're acting Persian to gov function, how can it be ultra virus (outside the scope), because if its outside the scope I figured then that means it's not government function.... because it's outside the scope. Idk. I'm sure there's more than one correct way to roll that thing out.

Me, I was consciously quite aware that I was confused about how the two different immunity issues ((1) gov't v proprietary function + (2) ultra vires/authority to contract) related to each other. I couldn't, after a few minute of thinking about it and re-skimming the cases, decide if one was a prerequisite for the other, if it was either/or, both/and, or how exactly the two halves fit together. So I made the conscious decision not to waste much time trying to figure that out. I made a calculated gamble that if I just argued each issue separately without pinpointing exactly how they relate to each other, I'd get a decent enough score. (and I just finessed the connection with the "could also be immune if..." kind of bridge)

Hopefully, we're all right

I was just as confused with this PT. I couldnt figure out how the ultra virus act analysis fit under the immunity analysis. Instead, I argued UV act under the third element of the QM arguement on section two; specifically, I argued that the city can't "accept" thereby form a contract without following the set procedures ( I.e meeting with a vote). That way, the Plaintiff couldn't establish all elements of QM claim without proving acceptance because individual members ( Mayor) can't form a contract (accept performance) without a vote.

I was hesitant to discuss UV under immunity because the question was specific ( immunity or not).

I am praying that We're all right and won't have to go thru this again.

[armenianBEAUTY]

What issues did people discuss for PR. Feel like I forced some. I went:

Attorney agreements
Contingency fees
Confidence
Competence
Diligence
Conflict
Concurrent conflict
Representation despite
Permissive withdrawal
Mandatory withdrawal

I agree w/ the need for "pushing" on this one. I felt like there weren't enough issues. The largest paragraph was all literally just L's attempts to communicate w/ C.

Anyway, my topics:

* I skipped fee agreement bc it said "valid agreement."
* Competence -- personal injury attorney doing slip & fall... no violation
* Keep client property safely -- dumbo stored clothes in his office closet... violation
* Duty not to obstruct access to evidence -- ruined clothes
* Duty to communicate
* Close relationship w/ opposing counsel
* Permissive withdrawal -- repugnant course of action
* Mandatory withdrawal -- possibly fraud using attorneys services
* (Non)duty to take cases (i.e. when C begged L to not "fire" her after L had already given notice of withdrawal)
* Post withdrawal, inform client of withdrawal
* Post withdrawal, must return all client's property to client so she can continue w/ case... problematic here bc property is damaged and will prejudice her

I argued the same. But there wasn't a lot of big issues. I did really have to stretch those facts to make some arguments. But I did miss duty to properly withdraw... Damn

I'm kind of stressing about this though. I'm just having a hard time accepting that this was really it...

[Lawless!]

Overall, I'd say day 3 was more manageable than day 1. In the Wills Q I forgot to do the CP interest for the husband. Forgot to hit impeachment on the evidence Q. And that remedies Q was a clusterfuck to say the least. Lol and can't even remember the details of PT 1 but I hated statutory construction. it's going to be a long 2.5 months...

[sittin_pretty]

We should all meet back up here the weekend of May 12th and celebrate our passing scores and maybe even have a meet up in person at Big Sur this summer to celebrate!

[CalBar3Day]

We should all meet back up here the weekend of May 12th and celebrate our passing scores and maybe even have a meet up in person at Big Sur this summer to celebrate!

This sounds like the best idea. Fingers crossed I pass....and that Hwy 1 is fixed before then. No one's getting into Big Sur for a while.