Difference between Fee Tail and Rule in Shellys Case? Forum
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Difference between Fee Tail and Rule in Shellys Case?
Title says it all. Im studying for the Bar and my jurisdiction says it abolishes the Fee Tail but also abolishes the rule in Shellys case. To me the RSC seemed to just be another way of saying the fee tail is abolished. So how can you abolished RSC and also abolish the fee tail?
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Re: Difference between Fee Tail and Rule in Shellys Case?
Property was never a strong suit for me, but I'll take a stab at the possible policy reason. Fee tail can be given to anyone, but I think RSC was your issue.
I'm probably wrong though. What jurisdiction?
I'm probably wrong though. What jurisdiction?
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Re: Difference between Fee Tail and Rule in Shellys Case?
Great question. My hot take:
Abolishing the fee tail means that a grant of “Blackacre to A and the heirs of his body” becomes a grant to A in fee simple.
The Rule in Shelley’s Case, however, does something slightly different, and at common law it was used for both future interests in fee tail AND future interests following life estates. (It doesn’t totally defeat the purpose of a fee tail, but that is a longer story.) A jurisdiction that has abolished the fee tail but not the RSC would still use the RSC for remainders to life estates, so that a grant of “Blackacre to A for life, then to A’s heirs” (note the absence of “of the body”) would vest the heirs’ contingent remainder in A, with A again taking in fee simple.
If the RSC is *abolished, however, it becomes possible to make that conveyance “to A for life, then to A’s heirs.” (Again, it’s life estate language here, not fee tail langauge, so in this instance it doesn’t matter that the tail is abolished.) Abolishment of the RSC means that A takes only a life estate, with a contingent remainder that will vest at A’s death, when the heirs are ascertained.
Abolishing the fee tail means that a grant of “Blackacre to A and the heirs of his body” becomes a grant to A in fee simple.
The Rule in Shelley’s Case, however, does something slightly different, and at common law it was used for both future interests in fee tail AND future interests following life estates. (It doesn’t totally defeat the purpose of a fee tail, but that is a longer story.) A jurisdiction that has abolished the fee tail but not the RSC would still use the RSC for remainders to life estates, so that a grant of “Blackacre to A for life, then to A’s heirs” (note the absence of “of the body”) would vest the heirs’ contingent remainder in A, with A again taking in fee simple.
If the RSC is *abolished, however, it becomes possible to make that conveyance “to A for life, then to A’s heirs.” (Again, it’s life estate language here, not fee tail langauge, so in this instance it doesn’t matter that the tail is abolished.) Abolishment of the RSC means that A takes only a life estate, with a contingent remainder that will vest at A’s death, when the heirs are ascertained.