NYC to 200k Forum

[Anonymous User]

Updated Wall of Shame for a new day. Also fixed the L5Y growth rates; had the wrong formula in the spreadsheet across the board. (If Fried Frank's PPP growth seems crazy, yes, they actually did boost PPP from $1.32MM to $2.94MM over the past five years.)

Wall of Shame for Firms Yet to Announce:

• Kirkland ($4.70MM PPP, 44.7% L5Y PPP growth, 3.0 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Davis Polk ($3.70MM PPP, 50.7% L5Y PPP growth, 3.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Weil ($3.64MM PPP, 63.2% L5Y PPP growth, 3.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Paul Weiss ($4.56MM PPP, 36.2% L5Y PPP growth, 3.6 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Milbank ($3.46MM PPP, 41.5% L5Y PPP growth, 2.6 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Fried Frank ($2.94MM PPP, 123.7% L5Y PPP growth, 2.9 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Simpson ($3.68MM PPP, 38.2% L5Y PPP growth, 3.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Skadden ($3.47MM PPP, 32.7% L5Y PPP growth, 2.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  SullCrom ($4.27MM PPP, 23.8% L5Y PPP growth, 3.1 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Willkie ($2.97MM PPP, 43.4% L5Y PPP growth, 2.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  1. Akin Gump ($2.39MM PPP, 54.9% L5Y PPP growth, 2.0 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  2. Latham ($3.25MM PPP, 33.0% L5Y PPP growth, 3.0 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  3. Paul Hastings ($2.91MM PPP, 39.7% L5Y PPP growth, 2.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  4. Boies ($3.27MM PPP, 20.1% L5Y PPP growth, 2.0 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  4. Shearman ($2.32MM PPP, 52.4% L5Y PPP growth, 2.6 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Vinson & Elkins ($2.36MM PPP, 60.6% L5Y PPP growth, 3.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Quinn ($4.74MM PPP, 6.8% L5Y PPP growth, 2.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  6. King & Spalding ($2.61MM PPP, 31.2% L5Y PPP growth, 2.1 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Cravath ($4.00MM PPP, 14.2% L5Y PPP growth, 4.3 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  7. Gibson Dunn ($3.24MM PPP, 15.3% L5Y PPP growth, 2.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Schulte ($2.56MM PPP, 21.6% L5Y PPP growth, 2.1 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  8. WilmerHale ($2.12MM PPP, 44.9% L5Y PPP growth, 2.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Ropes ($2.32MM PPP, 46.1% L5Y PPP growth, 3.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Dechert ($2.68MM PPP, 27.8% L5Y PPP growth, 3.4 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Goodwin ($2.15MM PPP, 42.0% L5Y PPP growth, 2.3 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Proskauer ($2.37MM PPP, 27.9% L5Y PPP growth, 2.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Cahill ($3.69MM PPP, 3.9% L5Y PPP growth, 2.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Cooley ($2.08MM PPP, 39.4% L5Y PPP growth, 2.4 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Winston ($2.16MM PPP, 44.8% L5Y PPP growth, 3.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)[/s]
  9. Baker Botts ($1.84MM PPP, 35.1% L5Y PPP growth, 1.9 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Cleary ($3.07MM PPP, 17.3% L5Y PPP growth, 3.7 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Debevoise ($2.83MM PPP, 36.2% L5Y PPP growth, 5.3 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Sidley ($2.26MM PPP, 25.6% L5Y PPP growth, 2.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Wilson Sonsini ($2.21MM PPP, 34.4% L5Y PPP growth, 3.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)[/s]
  10. Alston & Bird ($1.93MM PPP, 12.3% L5Y PPP growth, 1.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  White & Case ($2.26MM PPP, 32.9% L5Y PPP growth, 3.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Kramer Levin ($2.15MM PPP, 28.5% L5Y PPP growth, 3.1 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  11. Sheppard ($1.71MM PPP, 35.2% L5Y PPP growth, 2.4 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  12. Cadwalader ($2.51MM PPP, -5.3% L5Y PPP growth, 4.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  12. Mayer Brown ($1.58MM PPP, 37.0% L5Y PPP growth, 2.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  14. Holland & Knight ($1.36MM PPP, 43.2% L5Y PPP growth, 2.1 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  15. McDermott ($1.71MM PPP, 17.3% L5Y PPP growth, 1.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  16. Katten ($1.57MM PPP, 19.8% L5Y PPP growth, 1.7 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  17. Fragomen ($1.98MM PPP, 31.4% L5Y PPP growth, 4.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  18. Covington ($1.54MM PPP, 22.0% L5Y PPP growth, 2.0 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  18. Greenberg ($1.63MM PPP, 20.1% L5Y PPP growth, 2.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  20. Fish & Richardson ($1.63MM PPP, 9.8% L5Y PPP growth, 1.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  20. MoFo ($1.74MM PPP, 18.1% L5Y PPP growth, 2.7 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  22. O'Melveny ($2.01MM PPP, -2.5% L5Y PPP growth, 3.3 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Orrick ($1.86MM PPP, 14.3% L5Y PPP growth, 3.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  23. Fenwick ($1.51MM PPP, 31.0% L5Y PPP growth, 2.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  24. Jenner ($1.42MM PPP, -4.9% L5Y PPP growth, 1.7 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Baker McKenzie ($1.30MM PPP, 19.3% L5Y PPP growth, 2.7 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Morgan Lewis ($1.37MM PPP, -11.7% L5Y PPP growth, 1.3 EP:Assoc. leverage)

Legend:
New York
California
Washington, D.C.
Chicago
Houston
Boston
Atlanta
Philadelphia
Florida

Sorry if you already explained it, but what does the ordering of the firms indicate?

[Anonymous User]

Orrick matched according to ATL. Power move. Middle finger to Latham and GDC.

Did they match in all offices?? Memo makes it seem that way. Huge for the smaller offices like Seattle and Sacramento if that's the case.

[Anonymous User]

Orrick matched according to ATL. Power move. Middle finger to Latham and GDC.

Did they match in all offices?? Memo makes it seem that way. Huge for the smaller offices like Seattle and Sacramento if that's the case.

It'd be kinda weird to not match in an office with only a handful of associates. The cost isn't that high, relatively speaking.

[NakedPowerOrgan]

Sorry if you already explained it, but what does the ordering of the firms indicate?

Combination of ability to pay, using current PPP and ratio of equity partners to associates, and profit growth, using historical growth over the past five years as best guess for future growth while also implicitly assuming that partners should share the wealth received over the past few years.

[Anonymous User]

Sorry if you already explained it, but what does the ordering of the firms indicate?

Combination of ability to pay, using current PPP and ratio of equity partners to associates, and profit growth, using historical growth over the past five years as best guess for future growth while also implicitly assuming that partners should share the wealth received over the past few years.

I feel like we shouldn't really be counting firms that don't pay market in their home offices (K&S and A&B). Also do those firms pay full market anywhere or do they just start at 180k in some offices? Underpaying associates is a great way to make your financials look better, when the bottom line is that they would probably struggle to afford to pay the previous scale.

[NakedPowerOrgan]

Sorry if you already explained it, but what does the ordering of the firms indicate?

Combination of ability to pay, using current PPP and ratio of equity partners to associates, and profit growth, using historical growth over the past five years as best guess for future growth while also implicitly assuming that partners should share the wealth received over the past few years.

I feel like we shouldn't really be counting firms that don't pay market in their home offices (K&S and A&B).

It's pretty shameful that they're raking in tons of cash and not paying market in home offices, right?

[Anonymous User]

Sorry if you already explained it, but what does the ordering of the firms indicate?

Combination of ability to pay, using current PPP and ratio of equity partners to associates, and profit growth, using historical growth over the past five years as best guess for future growth while also implicitly assuming that partners should share the wealth received over the past few years.

I feel like we shouldn't really be counting firms that don't pay market in their home offices (K&S and A&B).

Think those firms pay market everywhere else tho. K&S in particular has a pretty big presence in DC and Texas.

[Anonymous User]

Magic circle firms haven't matched except for Clifford Chance, which always moves fast.

[Anonymous User]

Sorry if you already explained it, but what does the ordering of the firms indicate?

Combination of ability to pay, using current PPP and ratio of equity partners to associates, and profit growth, using historical growth over the past five years as best guess for future growth while also implicitly assuming that partners should share the wealth received over the past few years.

I feel like we shouldn't really be counting firms that don't pay market in their home offices (K&S and A&B).

It's pretty shameful that they're raking in tons of cash and not paying market in home offices, right?

Agreed. I guess my point is that they're not really as financially capable as the numbers would indicate though because underpaying their associates makes them more profitable.

[Anonymous User]

Magic circle firms haven't matched except for Clifford Chance, which always moves fast.

Also Freshfields.

[jbagelboy]

Magic circle firms haven't matched except for Clifford Chance, which always moves fast.

Also Freshfields.

fyi freshfields only matched the old milbank scale, so 4th-8th yrs are still undercompensated relative to cravath

[NakedPowerOrgan]

Sorry if you already explained it, but what does the ordering of the firms indicate?

Combination of ability to pay, using current PPP and ratio of equity partners to associates, and profit growth, using historical growth over the past five years as best guess for future growth while also implicitly assuming that partners should share the wealth received over the past few years.

I feel like we shouldn't really be counting firms that don't pay market in their home offices (K&S and A&B).

It's pretty shameful that they're raking in tons of cash and not paying market in home offices, right?

Agreed. I guess my point is that they're not really as financially capable as the numbers would indicate though because underpaying their associates makes them more profitable.

True. If I had way more time, could probably get a lot better idea of calculating the cost of raising to market. Rankings are back-of-napkin calculations, although I would be shocked if K&S or A&B couldn't very easily raise salaries in their home offices to market. Would likely be a relative drop in the bucket for their PPP, especially given both firms' low leverage.

[lawhopeful100]

When you account for cost of living people in markets like Atlanta still come out ahead. Though if associates in other low-cost cities like Houston make market then there's a good argument that folks in ATL should as well. Texas has got to be the absolute sweet spot for being a biglaw associate btw when you weigh compensation, cost of living, difficulty of entering the market and quality of life.

At first sure, but not at later class years. The difference in senior associate comp between ATL and NYC after the latest raises is probably in the vicinity of $200k.

According to a cost of living calculator I just found $340,000 in Manhattan equals roughly $150,000 in ATL. Still looks like the ATL folks come out ahead. Granted I'm not taking bonuses into consideration.

You're forgetting the $100k bonus. Also meh on those COL calculators. NYC is expensive but you're not paying $200k more on COL than someone in ATL. That's just ridiculous.

Property values bruh. A biglaw associate in NYC probably rents an 800 square foot apartment for almost $3,000/month. A biglaw associate in Atlanta can rent a two-bedroom apartment for half that. Random anecdote but I know a finance dude in ATL who makes low six-figures who bought a house after a few years on the job. The actual cost of living probably isn't as great but spending $40k/year on rent versus having a mortgage for $20,000/year and gaining equity definitely makes a big difference.

Where are you living in Atlanta that a 2 bedroom is $1500. I work in big law in Atlanta and most 1 bedrooms are $1500-$2200 (I just signed a new lease to move from my $1500 apartment to a $2000 one. The $1500 place is the oldest building in my area and further from restaurants / shops). My buddy got a 2 bedroom in Inman Park that might be $2600 a month or so. I’m sure $1500 two bedroom places exist, but I doubt many are ones that big law associates want to live in.

[Anonymous User]

Can we please not have the same COL discussion we've had 30x already in this thread? Let's go back to shitting on DC firms for being cheap instead.

[Anonymous User]

Can we please not have the same COL discussion we've had 30x already in this thread? Let's go back to shitting on DC firms for being cheap instead.

[Anonymous User]

If you live in NY and think Houston is a better deal, then lateral to Houston. If you live in Houston and think NY is a better deal, then lateral to NY. If you can't get a job in the other city, then go fuck yourself and be happy with what you've got.

[Anonymous User]

Anyone here work for Latham or GDC? Are associates at your firm confident the match is coming or is morale starting to sour? I’m at another Cal firm that has yet to match and I want some anonymous, unverifiable assurances one of you will match soon to force the hand of my firm.

Absolutely confident we'll match (with some cheap shenanigans expected re the summer bonus), but there is definite grumbling about the messaging of making associates wait this long.

[Anonymous User]

Can we please not have the same COL discussion we've had 30x already in this thread? Let's go back to shitting on DC firms for being cheap instead.

+1

If we're going to rehash the same thing over and over, can it at least be Covington's hilarious email from the previous salary raises?

[Anonymous User]

Wall of Shame for Firms Yet to Announce:

• Kirkland ($4.70MM PPP, 44.7% L5Y PPP growth, 3.0 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Davis Polk ($3.70MM PPP, 50.7% L5Y PPP growth, 3.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Weil ($3.64MM PPP, 63.2% L5Y PPP growth, 3.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Paul Weiss ($4.56MM PPP, 36.2% L5Y PPP growth, 3.6 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Milbank ($3.46MM PPP, 41.5% L5Y PPP growth, 2.6 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Fried Frank ($2.94MM PPP, 123.7% L5Y PPP growth, 2.9 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Simpson ($3.68MM PPP, 38.2% L5Y PPP growth, 3.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Skadden ($3.47MM PPP, 32.7% L5Y PPP growth, 2.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  SullCrom ($4.27MM PPP, 23.8% L5Y PPP growth, 3.1 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Willkie ($2.97MM PPP, 43.4% L5Y PPP growth, 2.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  1. Akin Gump ($2.39MM PPP, 54.9% L5Y PPP growth, 2.0 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  2. Latham ($3.25MM PPP, 33.0% L5Y PPP growth, 3.0 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  3. Paul Hastings ($2.91MM PPP, 39.7% L5Y PPP growth, 2.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  4. Boies ($3.27MM PPP, 20.1% L5Y PPP growth, 2.0 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  4. Shearman ($2.32MM PPP, 52.4% L5Y PPP growth, 2.6 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Vinson & Elkins ($2.36MM PPP, 60.6% L5Y PPP growth, 3.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Quinn ($4.74MM PPP, 6.8% L5Y PPP growth, 2.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  6. King & Spalding ($2.61MM PPP, 31.2% L5Y PPP growth, 2.1 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Cravath ($4.00MM PPP, 14.2% L5Y PPP growth, 4.3 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  7. Gibson Dunn ($3.24MM PPP, 15.3% L5Y PPP growth, 2.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Schulte ($2.56MM PPP, 21.6% L5Y PPP growth, 2.1 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  8. WilmerHale ($2.12MM PPP, 44.9% L5Y PPP growth, 2.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Ropes ($2.32MM PPP, 46.1% L5Y PPP growth, 3.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Dechert ($2.68MM PPP, 27.8% L5Y PPP growth, 3.4 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Goodwin ($2.15MM PPP, 42.0% L5Y PPP growth, 2.3 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Proskauer ($2.37MM PPP, 27.9% L5Y PPP growth, 2.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Cahill ($3.69MM PPP, 3.9% L5Y PPP growth, 2.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Cooley ($2.08MM PPP, 39.4% L5Y PPP growth, 2.4 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Winston ($2.16MM PPP, 44.8% L5Y PPP growth, 3.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)[/s]
  9. Baker Botts ($1.84MM PPP, 35.1% L5Y PPP growth, 1.9 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Cleary ($3.07MM PPP, 17.3% L5Y PPP growth, 3.7 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Debevoise ($2.83MM PPP, 36.2% L5Y PPP growth, 5.3 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Sidley ($2.26MM PPP, 25.6% L5Y PPP growth, 2.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Wilson Sonsini ($2.21MM PPP, 34.4% L5Y PPP growth, 3.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)[/s]
  10. Alston & Bird ($1.93MM PPP, 12.3% L5Y PPP growth, 1.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  White & Case ($2.26MM PPP, 32.9% L5Y PPP growth, 3.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Kramer Levin ($2.15MM PPP, 28.5% L5Y PPP growth, 3.1 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  11. Sheppard ($1.71MM PPP, 35.2% L5Y PPP growth, 2.4 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  12. Cadwalader ($2.51MM PPP, -5.3% L5Y PPP growth, 4.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  12. Mayer Brown ($1.58MM PPP, 37.0% L5Y PPP growth, 2.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  14. Holland & Knight ($1.36MM PPP, 43.2% L5Y PPP growth, 2.1 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  15. McDermott ($1.71MM PPP, 17.3% L5Y PPP growth, 1.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  16. Katten ($1.57MM PPP, 19.8% L5Y PPP growth, 1.7 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  17. Fragomen ($1.98MM PPP, 31.4% L5Y PPP growth, 4.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  18. Covington ($1.54MM PPP, 22.0% L5Y PPP growth, 2.0 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  18. Greenberg ($1.63MM PPP, 20.1% L5Y PPP growth, 2.2 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  20. Fish & Richardson ($1.63MM PPP, 9.8% L5Y PPP growth, 1.5 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  20. MoFo ($1.74MM PPP, 18.1% L5Y PPP growth, 2.7 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  22. O'Melveny ($2.01MM PPP, -2.5% L5Y PPP growth, 3.3 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Orrick ($1.86MM PPP, 14.3% L5Y PPP growth, 3.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  23. Fenwick ($1.51MM PPP, 31.0% L5Y PPP growth, 2.8 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  24. Jenner ($1.42MM PPP, -4.9% L5Y PPP growth, 1.7 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Baker McKenzie ($1.30MM PPP, 19.3% L5Y PPP growth, 2.7 EP:Assoc. leverage)
  Morgan Lewis ($1.37MM PPP, -11.7% L5Y PPP growth, 1.3 EP:Assoc. leverage)

Legend:
New York
California
Washington, D.C.
Chicago
Houston
Boston
Atlanta
Philadelphia
Florida

Where are these numbers coming from? Shearman's 50% PPP growth in the last 5 years seems huge, I didn't think they were doing that well.

[JustHawkin]

If you live in NY and think Houston is a better deal, then lateral to Houston. If you live in Houston and think NY is a better deal, then lateral to NY. If you can't get a job in the other city, then go fuck yourself and be happy with what you've got.

Sage.

[NakedPowerOrgan]

Where are these numbers coming from? Shearman's 50% PPP growth in the last 5 years seems huge, I didn't think they were doing that well.

Coming from 2012 AmLaw numbers and 2017 AmLaw numbers. Shearman had $1.52MM PPP in 2012 (ranked #37) and $2.32MM in 2017 (ranked #28).

[Anonymous User]

Where are these numbers coming from? Shearman's 50% PPP growth in the last 5 years seems huge, I didn't think they were doing that well.

I recall a few years ago Shearman de-equitizing a large number of partners with the aim of rapidly boosting profitability. I would be interested to know the decline in # of equity partners over this same period. I would guess at least 20%.

[nealric]

Where are these numbers coming from? Shearman's 50% PPP growth in the last 5 years seems huge, I didn't think they were doing that well.

I recall a few years ago Shearman de-equitizing a large number of partners with the aim of rapidly boosting profitability. I would be interested to know the decline in # of equity partners over this same period. I would guess at least 20%.

Part of why RPL is a better metric. Firms play tons of games with PPP by limiting the number of equity partners.

[Anonymous User]

Anyone here work for Latham or GDC? Are associates at your firm confident the match is coming or is morale starting to sour? I’m at another Cal firm that has yet to match and I want some anonymous, unverifiable assurances one of you will match soon to force the hand of my firm.

100% chance GDC matches whatever Latham does. 99% chance Latham matches, no idea why they're taking their sweet time. GDC management always tells its associates that it will never be leader in compensation, but will always follow the market. And in terms of what the "market" is, GDC management only looks at "peer firms," which at this point is really only Latham (used to include OMM and MoFo and maybe PH, but over the past 15 years Latham and GDC have left them behind; and Quinn is too much of an upstart and still viewed as too much like a plaintiffs' firm to be a peer).

[Anonymous User]

If Orrick can match, surely OMM can too.